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The Preußenrenaissance Revisited: German-German Entanglements, the Media and 
the Politics of History in the late German Democratic Republic* 
André Keil 
 
I. Introduction 
As a significant body of scholarship has convincingly demonstrated, conceptions of 
history and public representations of collective identity were closely entangled 
phenomena in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) from its very foundation.1 The 
notion of an independent East German nation, concepts of socialist statehood and ideas 
about citizenship were negotiated with reference to historical narratives that were based 
on often mythical conceptions of the past.2 The GDR’s politics of history 
(Geschichtspolitik) involved a constant reworking of these myths according to their 
perceived utility for the creation of political legitimacy.3 The particularities of this process 
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 I. Kowalczuk, Legitimation eines neuen Staates: Parteiarbeiter an der historischen Front. 
Geschichtswissenschaft in der SBZ/DDR 1945-1961 (Berlin, 1997), pp. 37-47; Sigrid 
Meuschel, Legitimation und Parteienherrschaft: Zum Paradox von Stabilität und Revolution 
in der DDR (Frankfurt/Main, 1993), pp. 22-24; See also for a more comprehensive account 
of the early GDR: G. Prichard, The Making of the GDR, 1945-1953 (Manchester, 2004); D. 
Orlow, ‘The GDR’s Failed Search for a National Identity, 1945-1989’, German Studies 
Review, 29, 3 (2006), pp. 537-558; M. Myers Feinstein, State Symbols: The Quest for 
Legitimacy in the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, 1949-
1959 (Boston and Leiden, 2001); B. Giesen, Intellectuals and the German Nation: Collective 
Identity in a German Axial Age (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 142-164; J. Palmowski, Inventing a 
Socialist Nation: Heimat and the Politics of Everyday Life in the GDR, 1945-1990 
(Cambridge, 2009); G. Knischewski, ‘Post-War National Identity in Germany’ in B. Jenkins 
and S. A. Sofos (eds), Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe (Abingdon, 1996), pp. 
118-144. For a discussion of the longue durée of the relationship between historiography and 
the construction of national identities in Germany, see S. Berger, The Search for Normality: 
National Identity and Historical Consciousness in Germany since 1800 (New York and 
Oxford, 2003), esp. pp.  21-110.  
2
 R. Zimmering, Mythen in der Politik der DDR. Ein Beitrag zur Erforschung politischer 
Mythen (Leverkusen, 2000); A. Nothnagle, ‘From Buchenwald to Bismarck: Historical 
Myth-Building in the German Democratic Republic, 1945-1989’, Central European History, 
26, 1 (1993), pp. 91-113; idem, Building the East German Myth: Historical Mythology and 
Youth Propaganda in the German Democratic Republic, 1945-1989 (Ann Arbor, MI, 1999). 
3
 M. Fulbrook, ’DDR-Geschichtswissenschaft und Geschichtspolitik’, in G. Iggers et al. 
(eds), Die DDR-Geschichtswissenschaft als Forschungsproblem, Historische Zeitschrift 
Beihefte 27 (Munich, 1997), pp. 419-429; M. Sabrow (ed.), Verwaltete Vergangenheit: 
Geschichtskultur und Herrschaftslegitimation in der DDR (Leipzig, 1997). 
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reveal how ambiguous and contradictory the construction of historical collective 
identities can be. 
The leadership of the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische 
Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED) was under constant pressure to legitimize its regime 
and put significant efforts into propaganda campaigns that sought to enhance public 
acceptance.4 The negotiation of rupture and continuity was a constant feature of the 
official historical discourse, which emphasized the unique character of the GDR as the 
sole state that was both truly German and socialist.5 This phenomenon was clearly 
illustrated by the representations of Prussian history in the GDR. Throughout its 
existence, Prussia was used as a reference point – both positive and negative – for the 
politics of identity of the East German state.  
During the early years, until approximately 1953, the idea of antifascist 
reconstruction – that is to say, a complete break with the fateful Prussian past and the 
building of a socialist ‘New Germany’ – dominated the propaganda of the SED and its 
affiliated organizations.6 Immediately after the Second World War, intellectuals such as 
the formerly exiled communist and later GDR Minister of Culture, Alexander Abusch, 
but also liberal historians such as the West German Friedrich Meinecke, drew a direct 
line from the authoritarianism and militarism that seemed to have run like a common 
thread through Prussian history to the German catastrophe of fascism and total defeat.7 
This view was epitomized by the land reform campaigns of 1945 and 1948, which 
primarily targeted the East Elbian large landowners. With anti-Prussian slogans such as 
‘Junker’s land in peasants’ hands’ (Junkerland in Bauernhand), the SED promoted and 
carried out the redistribution of land as a means of disempowering the Junker class, which 
                                                          
4
 Kowalczuk, Legitimation eines neuen Staates, pp. 24-30; M. Allinson, Politics and Popular 
Opinion in East Germany, 1945-68 (Manchester, 2000), esp. pp. 12-66. 
5
 On changing conceptions of the German nation and German nationality in the GDR, see M. 
Fulbrook, German National Identity after the Holocaust (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 130-134 and 
189-191; see also M. Lemke, ‘Nationalismus und Patriotismus in den frühen Jahren der 
DDR’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 50 (2000), pp. 11-19.   
6
 J. Danyel, ‘Die Opfer- und Verfolgtenperspektive als Gründungskonsens? Zum Umgang 
mit der Widerstandstraditon und Schuldfrage in der DDR’, in ibid. (ed.), Die geteilte 
Vergangenheit. Zum Umgang mit Nationalsozialismus und Widerstand in beiden deutschen 
Staaten (Berlin, 1995), pp. 31-46; A. Leo and P. Reif-Spiek (eds), Helden, Täter und 
Verräter: Studien zum DDR-Antifaschismus (Berlin, 1999); M. Fulbrook, The People’s State: 
East German Society from Hitler to Honecker  (New Haven, CT, 2005), pp. 21-48. 
7
 A. Abusch, Der Irrweg einer Nation. Ein Beitrag zum Verständnis deutscher Geschichte 
(Berlin, 1946); F. Meinecke, Die deutsche Katastrophe. Betrachtungen und Erinnerungen 
(Wiesbaden, 1946). See also E. Wolfrum, Geschichte als Waffe: Vom Kaiserreich bis zur 
Wiedervereinigung (Göttingen, 2001), pp. 62-69.  
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they saw as the embodiment of Prussianism, militarism and fascism.8 This condemnation 
of Prussia was also enshrined in the Allied Control Council Law No. 46, which stated that 
it had been ‘from its early days […] a bearer of militarism and reaction in Germany’.9 
Later, the most apparent symbols of Prussian history and dominance, including 
the Berlin city castle and the equestrian statue of Frederick II on the boulevard Unter den 
Linden in Berlin, were either destroyed or removed from the architectural heart of the 
now socialist capital. Another manifestation of this apparent break with the Prussian past 
was the re-opening of the Neue Wache building in the city centre of Berlin and its explicit 
re-dedication as a memorial for the ‘victims of fascism and militarism’ in 1960. The 
policy of the symbolic destruction of the reactionary Prussian past continued until 1968 
when the Garrison Church (Garnisonkirche) in Potsdam was demolished. These measures 
were supposed to demonstrate that the socialist leadership was serious about their 
proclaimed break with the Prussian past. According to its self-conception, the new 
socialist German state was the antithesis to Prussia and all that it stood for. This early 
version of the official GDR identity combined a rejection of Prussian with an affirmation 
of progressive traditions in German history such as the revolution of 1848, the history of 
the German labour movement and the antifascist resistance against Hitler, particularly 
emphasizing the communist sacrifices. 
Against this backdrop, observers reacted with astonishment when, in the late 
1970s, Prussia re-emerged as a key historical reference point for the GDR.10 
Contemporaries in the West characterized this phenomenon as a veritable ‘Prussia 
Renaissance’ (Preußenrenaissance), which had started around 1979. Although the 
equation of the GDR with Prussia was not entirely new in western discourse, it now 
became a commonplace to refer to it as the ‘Red Prussia’.11 Historians have recognized 
                                                          
8
 A. Bauerkämper, ‘Die Bodenreform in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone in vergleichender 
und beziehungsgeschichtlicher Perspektive: Einleitung, in Idem (ed.), Junkerland in 
Bauernhand? Durchführung, Auswirkungen und Stellenwert der Bodenreform in der 
sowjetischen Besatzungszone (Stuttgart, 1996), pp. 7-20; H. Reif, ‘Die Junker’, in E. Francois 
and H. Schulze (eds), Deutsche Erinnerungsorte, Vol. 1 (Munich, 2001), pp. 520-535. 
9 ‘Allied Contƌol CounĐil Law No. 46‘, Ƌuoted in E. R Huďeƌ ;ed.Ϳ, Quellen zum Staatsrecht 
der Neuzeit. Vol. 2: Deutsche Verfassungsdokumente der Gegenwart 1919-1951 (Tübingen, 
1951), p. 648. 
10
 For examples from English-speaking newspapers, see E. Lentz, ‘Interest in Prussia 
Reviving’, The New York Times (18 December 1978); B. Graham, ‘East and West Recall 
Discipline, Liberty of Prussia’, The Washington Post (2 November 1981); P. Clough, ‘The 
Prussian Revolution on both Sides of the Wall’, The Times (15 August 1981), p. 10. 
11
 A 1977 book by The Guardian’s GDR correspondent Jonathan Steele offers an excellent 
example. Its cover image features a Prussian-style spiked helmet decorated with hammer and 
sickle: J. Steele, Socialism with a German Face: The State that Came from the Cold (London, 
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the significance of this shift and interpreted it as a move towards more conservative 
notions of national history and identity.12 Yet, they have primarily discussed the 
involvement of academic historians in creating and disseminating the new image of the 
Prussian past.13 In contrast, the promotion of this new ideological course through the mass 
media and the responses by the East German population remain understudied.  
This article critically examines the Preußenrenaissance whilst demonstrating how 
this shift was negotiated within the SED and intellectual circles. In addition, it explores 
an underestimated aspect of this ‘Prussian turn’ in GDR historiography, namely its 
entanglement with similar developments in West Germany. Indeed, the re-emergence of 
Prussianism in the GDR of the 1980s cannot be solely understood as a top-down process: 
it was a complex phenomenon in which many self-willed actors became involved. A 
consideration of the productions of the East German state television Fernsehen der DDR 
(GDR TV) and their viewers’ reactions sheds light on this chequered process. As a whole, 
an examination of the discourse about Prussia reveals the inner dynamics and 
contradictions of the GDR’s politics of history during the last decade or so of the regime’s 
existence. 
 
II. Economic stagnation, political crisis and the rise of ͚tradition and heritage͛ as 
contexts for the Preußenrenaissance 
The re-emergence of Prussia as a part of the GDR’s official conception of history was 
connected to broader changes in the official politics of collective identity during the 
1970s. Conventionally, this has been associated with a new discourse on tradition and 
heritage (Tradition und Erbe).14  Within this ‘tradition and heritage’ paradigm, the GDR 
                                                          
1977). In West Germany, the right-of-centre author Wolfgang Venohr promoted the view of 
the GDR as the ‘Red Prussia’. See for example W. Venohr, ‘Die roten Preußen der 
Volksarmee’, Die Zeit (15 March 1963), p. 4; Idem, Die roten Preußen: Vom wundersamen 
Aufstieg der DDR in Deutschland (Erlangen, 1989). 
12
 H. Schultz, ‘Die DDR-Geschichtswissenschaft in der Mitte der siebziger Jahre: 
Paradigmenwechsel oder konservative Wende?’, in G. Iggers et al. (eds), Die DDR-
Geschichtswissenschaft als Forschungsproblem, pp. 227-240. 
13
 J. H. Brinks, Die DDR-Geschichtswissenschaft auf dem Weg zur deutschen Einheit: Luther, 
Friedrich II und Bismarck als Paradigmen politischen Wandels (New York, 1992); H. A. 
Krauß and D. Stievermann, Die Rolle Preußens in  der DDR-Historiographie. Zur  
Thematisierung  und  Interpretation der preußischen Geschichte durch die ostdeutsche 
Geschichtswissenschaft (Frankfurt/Main, 1992). 
14
 M. Ackermann, ‘Phasen und Zäsuren im Erbeverständnis der DDR’, in: Deutscher 
Bundestag (ed.), Materialien der Enquetekommission ‘Aufarbeitung von  Geschichte  und  
Folgen  der  SED-Diktatur  in  Deutschland‘,  vol  3/2 (Baden Baden, 1995), pp. 768–795; 
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emphasized its role as the custodian of the entire heritage of the German people, having 
already claimed many of its progressive traditions.15 The adaption of Tradition und Erbe 
ostensibly allowed the integration of large parts of German national history, which had 
hitherto been seen as reactionary, into the concept of East German socialist identity.16 
However, maintaining a notion of distinct working-class traditions also facilitated an 
image of the past in which the GDR remained a ‘workers’ and peasants’ state’, rooted in 
the history of class struggle. This also implied an increased emphasis on aspects of 
German history that had hitherto been neglected by historians in the GDR. The re-
classification of large swathes of German national history as legitimate historical 
‘heritage’ thus allowed them to engage with topics outside the established Marxist-
Leninist approach to the past. As a result of this new conception of history, nationhood 
as a category increasingly superseded class as the main theme of historiography in the 
GDR. The Preußenrenaissance exemplified this fundamental re-interpretation of German 
history within the new theoretical framework of Tradition und Erbe. Prussia was 
transformed from an initially negative reference point into, firstly, an accepted part of the 
historical heritage, and then into a positively connoted tradition. 
The rise of the Tradition und Erbe conception of national history needs to be 
understood as a historical-political reaction to the GDR’s looming economic and societal 
crisis in the late 1970s.17 After a period of relative stability in the 1960s and early 1970s, 
increasing economic problems and the emergence of oppositional groups posed a 
significant challenge to authority of the SED regime.18 As Sigrid Meuschel has shown, 
                                                          
H. Meier and W. Schmidt (eds), Erbe und Tradition in der DDR: Die Debatte der Historiker  
(Berlin, 1988). 
15
 H. Bartel, ‘Historisches Erbe und Tradition’, Einheit, 3 (1981), pp. 272-278. 
16
 Regarding the ’two-strands’ paradigm of history in the GDR, see Brinks, DDR-
Geschichtswissenschaft, pp. 91-185; Kowalczuk, Legitimation eines neuen Staates, pp. 319–
341. 
17
 M. Allinson, ‘More from Less: Ideological Gambling with the Unity of Economic and 
Social Policy in Honecker's GDR’, Central European History, 45, 1 (2012), pp. 102-127; For 
a comprehensive economic history of the GDR see J. Kopstein, The Politics of Economic 
Decline in East Germany 1945-1989 (Chapel Hill and London, 1997), esp. pp. 173-194; H.-
U. Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte 1949-1990: Bundesrepublik Deutschland und 
DDR (Munich, 2008), pp. 98-107; C. Maier, Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the 
End of East Germany (Princeton, NJ, 1997), pp. 59-72. 
18 The fragile stability in the GDR that emerged after the construction of the Berlin Wall 
(1961) and particularly after the change of power from SED general secretary Walter Ulbricht 
to his disciple Erich Honecker (1971) has been widely discussed in the literature. The 
scholarly interpretations range from seeing this stability as the result of an ‘inner emigration’ 
to understanding it as a general ‘normalization of rule’. See, for example, M. Fulbrook (ed.), 
Power and Society in the GDR, 1961-1979. The ‘Normalisation of Rule’? (New York, 2009). 
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these developments triggered a significant loss of utopian ideals (Utopieverlust) amongst 
broad swathes of the East German population, causing a crisis of legitimacy for the 
SED.19 By the end of the 1970s, the old hegemonic narratives of social progress and 
socialism that had dominated the earlier period of stability appeared to contradict the 
obvious social reality of many East Germans. Furthermore, from 1980–1 onwards, the 
escalating political tensions in Poland created anxieties amongst the ruling elites about 
the possibility of similar developments in the GDR.20 It was therefore no coincidence that, 
in the face of stagnation and eventual crisis, a different official version of collective 
identity came to the fore. Germanness and nationalism now became dominant features of 
the popular representation of the official collective identity of the GDR.  
Within this context, the reference to Prussia had two major dimensions: on the 
one hand, the GDR was in most parts situated on the former core territories of the Prussian 
state, and it was thus possible to integrate aspects of Prussian history into the now 
spatially defined identity of the GDR.21 On the other hand, the symbolic integration of 
Prussia into the historical canon underpinned a growing emphasis on discipline, stability 
and loyalty in the GDR propaganda of the 1980s. This development was illustrated by the 
newly found appreciation for Prussia’s efficient bureaucracy and the stereotypical 
‘Prussian virtues’.22 
A consideration of the Preußenrenaissance’s main actors reveals another aspect 
of this ideological volte-face, however. Many of artists, journalists and academics who 
were involved in this process belonged to the age cohort born between the years 1928 and 
1930. Mary Fulbrook has described the ‘1929er’ generation – which had primarily been 
socialized during the Third Reich and the heyday of Stalinism in the GDR – as the ‘loyal 
                                                          
19
 S. Meuschel, Legitimation und Parteienherrschaft. Zum Paradox von Stabilität und 
Revolution in der DDR (Frankfurt/Main, 1993), pp. 227 ff; see also Maier, Dissolution, pp. 
3-58. 
20
 B. Olschowsky, ‘Polen und die DDR in den achtziger Jahren‘, in H. Timmermann (ed.), 
Die DDR in Europa – zwischen Isolation und Öffnung (Münster, 2005), pp. 47-56; E. 
Neubert, Geschichte der Opposition in der DDR 1949-1989 (Berlin, 1998), pp. 384-388. 
21
 K. Blaschke, ‘Die “marxistische” Regionalgeschichte. Ideologischer Zwang und 
Wirklichkeitsferne’, in Iggers et al., DDR-Geschichtswissenschaft als Forschungsproblem, 
pp. 341-368;  
22
 For a contemporary discussion of the significance and ‘symbolic order’ of Prussian history, 
see H. Pross, ‘Signale der Gewalt: Anmerkungen zum Preußenjahr’, Die Zeit (26 June 1981), 
p. 40. 
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carriers, critical supporters, and practical sustainers of the GDR regime’.23 Their 
allegiance, however, was often more dedicated to the GDR as the state that had offered 
them career opportunities and upward mobility, rather than to socialism as a progressive 
ideology.24 Moreover, their experiences made them more available for cultural 
mobilization than members of other age cohorts.25 It appears that many GDR citizens of 
this generation were better equipped to reconcile the ideological contradictions between 
the ideals of socialism and Prussianism than those belonging to other age cohorts. Their 
socialization as well as their roles in GDR society meant that stability and the 
maintenance of the status quo were in their interest. The now positively framed image of 
Prussia offered a model for identification with the state in the face of the apparent final 
crisis of the GDR. Yet, this specific generational aspect also explains why the appeal of 
this pattern of legitimization was mostly limited to one generation and why it failed to 
integrate other parts of the GDR society. 
 
III. An entangled history: debates about Prussia in East and West Germany in the late 
1970s and early 1980s 
The re-emergence of Prussianism in the GDR included an entangled German-German 
dimension that also tends to be overlooked.  A consideration of the interplay between the 
politics of history in East and West Germany opens up interesting perspectives: even 
though the official revision of the image of Prussia derived from the GDR’s changing 
politics of collective identity, the actual trigger for the media campaign came, somewhat 
counter-intuitively, from West Germany.  
In June 1977 – and hence at the same time as the GDR’s debates on tradition and 
heritage – the mayor of West Berlin, Dietrich Stobbe, proposed a major exhibition on 
Prussian history in the then empty building of the Reichstag.26 Stobbe argued that the 
highly successful Stauffer exhibition, hosted by the Württemberg State Museum in 
Stuttgart the same year, had demonstrated the Germans’ wish to know more about their 
pre-1933 history and that it was necessary to recognize Prussia as a part of this history. 
                                                          
23
 M. Fulbrook, Dissonant Lives: Generations and Violence Through the German 
Dictatorships (Oxford, 2011), p. 251. 
24
 Ibid., p. 258. 
25
 Ibid., p. 333. 
26
 ‘Stobbe will Preußisches im Reichstag sehen’, Die Welt (29 June 1977). 
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Aleida Assmann has emphasized the significance of the Stauffer exhibition as a turning 
point in the politics of history in West Germany.27 With over 671,000 visitors, it was one 
of the largest cultural events in the FRG during the 1970s. The exhibition was a 
cornerstone in the celebrations of the 25th anniversary of the unification of Baden and 
Württemberg. As such, it was supposed to contribute to the collective identity of the 
state.28 Yet, the Stauffer exhibition also provided an attractive model for other federal 
states: in 1980, for example, an exhibition about the Bavarian Wittelsbach dynasty was 
opened in Munich, attracting significant interest.29 The proposed Prussia exhibition in 
Berlin followed this model of the historical Landesausstellungen (state exhibitions), and 
Stobbe certainly saw it as a chance to promote a sense of regional identity in West Berlin. 
The fact, however, that the former Prussian state had covered the best part of what was 
now the GDR also indicates a more subtle attempt to emphasise the unity of the German 
nation. This had a particular significance at a time when the GDR still sought to dissociate 
itself from the idea of a German past shared with the West. Stobbe’s initiative therefore 
challenged the GDR’s claim to solely represent the whole of German history in the 
context of its new Tradition und Erbe paradigm. 
The official occasion for Stobbe’s plans was the celebration of the 200th birthday 
of Karl Friedrich Schinkel (1781–1841), who had been responsible for some of Berlin’s 
most iconic buildings. The connection between Prussia’s architectural genius and Berlin’s 
famous historic sites was supposed to provide the background for the planned exhibition. 
Eventually, the downright flood of publications, TV broadcasts and events in connection 
with the Prussia exhibition in Berlin made 1981 an almost semi-official ‘Prussia Year’ in 
West Berlin.30 Yet, the Prussia presented in 1981 was mainly that of the classic 
‘Frederician’ era of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. The more problematic 
aspects of Prussia’s history – for instance the violent suppression of the 1848 revolution 
and the repression of the Social Democracy under the Socialist Laws – were not denied 
                                                          
27
 A. Assmann, Geschichte im Gedächtnis: Von der individuellen Erfahrung zur öffentlichen 
Inszenierung (Munich, 2007), pp. 137-141; Idem, ‘Die Konstruktion von Geschichte im 
Museum’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 49 (2007), pp. 6-13. 
28 For a comprehensive discussion of the Stauffer-exhibition in Stutgart 1977, see M. Große 
Burlage, Große historische Ausstellungen in der Bundesrepublik 1960-2000 (Münster, 
2005), pp. 21-91. 
29
 Assmann, Geschichte im Gedächtnis, pp. 138-139. 
30
 K.-H. Janßen, ‘Vorbild, Mythos, Prägestock‘, Die Zeit (10 April 1981), p. 89; see also G. 
D. Rosenfeld, ‘A Mastered Past? Prussia in Postwar German Memory‘, German History, 22, 
4 (2004), pp. 505-535, esp. pp. 505-516. 
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but clearly far removed from the spotlight.31 This selective perception of the Prussian past 
set the tone for the subsequent debates in East and West. Yet, it should be noted that 
during the 1970s, a debate about history and national identity had also taken place in West 
Germany. The West German shift towards Prussia can be understood as a conservative 
response to the search for the allegedly ‘lost identity’ of the FRG, which had ensued since 
the mid-1970s.32 It is therefore not surprising that Stobbe’s idea received an 
overwhelmingly positive feedback.33 The then chairman of the Christian Democrats 
(CDU) and later chancellor Helmut Kohl welcomed the proposal publicly, as did the 
leaders of the Christian Social Union (CSU), Franz-Josef Strauß, and the Social 
Democrats (SPD), Willy Brandt.34 The overwhelmingly positive response to Stobbe’s 
idea from all political sides triggered a wave of newspaper articles about Prussia’s 
significance for the national identity of the West German state.  
The only fundamental critique of Stobbe’s proposal came initially from the Berlin 
SPD newspaper Berliner Stimme. In this periodical, Brigitte Seebacher, later the wife of 
Willy Brandt, warned that a one-sided appraisal of Prussian history would neglect the 
harsh repression of socialism and democracy that had occurred in the name of Prussian 
virtues and reasons of state.35 Her comments reflected the traditionally negative image of 
Prussia among the German left. However, responding in the nation-wide SPD newspaper 
Vorwärts shortly afterwards, the political commentator Peter Bender argued that the 
leftist aversion to Prussia needed to be overcome.36 He described the anti-Prussian reflex 
of the German left as understandable, given the shock of 1945, but stressed that a more 
differentiated view of Prussia was needed. He continued by stating that ‘Prussia is too 
                                                          
31
 Idem, ‘Weder Tempel noch Gerichtssaal. Die Ausstellung im Gropius-Bau als moralische 
Aufrüstung Berlins‘, Die Zeit (2 January 1981), p. 3. 
32
 E. Wolfrum, ‘Geschichtspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949-1989: Phasen 
und Kontroversen‘, in Idem and P. Bock (eds), Umkämpfte Vergangenheit: Geschichtsbilder, 
Erinnerung und Vergangenheitspolitik im internationalen Vergleich (Göttingen, 1999), pp. 
55-81, esp. pp. 65-76. For a contemporary discussion of the Prussia discourse in West 
Germany see H.-U. Wehler, Preußen ist wieder chic... Politik und Polemik in zwanzig Essays 
(Frankfurt/Main, 1983).  
33
 See e.g. a commentary by the Bild newspaper’s then editor-in-chief: H. Kremp, ‘Preuße 
sein ist besser’, Bild am Sonntag (10 July 1977). 
34
 ‘Die “Preußen”-Schau in Berlin findet Fürsprecher’, Die Welt (29 June 1977). 
35
 B. Seebacher, ‘Die Preußen sind längst da’, Berliner Stimme (30 July 1977). 
36
 P. Bender, ‘Nur Schwarzes aus Preußen?’, Vorwärts (11 August 1977) [translation by the 
author]; Peter Bender (1923-2008), classicist, historian and political commentator, belonged 
to the circle of political advisors of the Brandt administration that paved the way for the 
Ostpolitik the early 1970s. 
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important to be left to the Springer press and the SED. One does not need to be right-wing 
in the sense of being authoritarian to respect the Prussian virtues, or even more, to feel 
bound to them.’37 Shortly later, a similar line of argument would also be used by the SED 
to justify its ideological volte-face towards Prussia.  
The discourse about Prussian history, which ensued in the wake of the ‘Prussia 
Year 1981’, highlights how significant the topic had become in West Germany. Eminent 
historians such as Reinhard Koselleck, Wolfgang Mommsen, Theodor Schieder, Karl-
Dietrich Erdmann and Hagen Schulze contributed to this debate.38  Edgar Wolfrum has 
noted two major reasons for this heightened interest in Prussian history in the West: the 
first, more inward-looking aspect reflected the renewed debates about the historical 
identity of the FRG after the crisis of the ‘German Autumn’ in 1977. In this context, the 
debate about Prussia can also be understood as a symbolic struggle for the character of 
the West German state. Whereas West Germany’s public history discourse in the late 
1960s had emphasized the libertarian and democratic traditions in Germany’s past, a 
sense of crisis raised the appeal of conservative notions of national history. The Western 
discourse about Prussian history thus preceded chancellor Helmut Kohl’s proclaimed 
‘spiritual and moral turn’ (geistig-moralische Wende) in the 1980s.39 Secondly, the 
engagement with the Prussian past in the West also highlights the increased attempts to 
find a common historical ground with the almost simultaneous developments in the 
GDR.40 
Yet, the West German resurrection of Prussia was initially eyed critically in the 
East. In a broadcast on the GDR’s international station Stimme der DDR in May 1978, 
historian Siegfried Thomas condemned the West German excitement about Prussia as an 
attempt to rehabilitate reactionary Prussianism in order to reintroduce Prussian virtues 
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such as the alleged ‘absolute discipline, subordination under the state, absolute 
performance of duty, subservient spirit’.41 This opinion reflected the negative official 
image of Prussia that predominated in the GDR until 1979. Here, the originally 
pejoratively intended terms Preußenrenaissance and ‘Prussia Wave’ (Preußenwelle) 
were used by GDR commentators as polemical referencesto describe the West German 
developments. It is nonetheless remarkable how quick this position changed. From late 
1978, the official image of Prussia in the GDR was systematically revised and modified 
– firstly in official SED publications and academic journals and later in the state-
controlled mass media. Historians were crucial to this process. They did not invent a 
completely new conception of Prussian history. What was new, however, was the 
heightened attention paid by the state media to the subject previously contained within 
academia.  
A first sign of this shift was an article by historian Ingrid Mittenzwei in the Free 
German Youth’s (Freie Deutsche Jugend) main journal Forum, entitled ‘The Two Faces 
of Prussia’ (‘Die zwei Gesichter Preußens’) published in September 1978.42 Mittenzwei 
argued that it would be wrong for German socialists ‘to look for ruling classes only on 
the other side of the barricade’. The progressive periods in Prussia’s history had to be 
seen as integral parts of the GDR’s historical heritage. Certainly, so Mittenzwei argued, 
socialist forefathers such as Marx, Engels, Karl Liebknecht and Franz Mehring had been 
forced to combat their contemporary Prussia as an existing political enemy. But now, 
under the circumstances of the established socialism in the GDR, the time was ripe to 
recognise the progressive aspects of Prussian history too. The article read like a copy of 
Peter Bender’s earlier essay in the Vorwärts. Mittenzwei clearly signalled that the 
traditional theory of two disparate streams of development in German history – one 
progressive, the other reactionary – should be replaced by a more inclusive approach.  
The GDR’s turn towards Prussia was intensively scrutinized in the West, 
mirroring the previous attacks from the East regarding the proposed Prussia exhibition in 
Berlin. Whilst some conservative commentators saw it as a chance to revive the sense of 
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a shared common history and nationhood, others were more critical.43. The church 
newspaper Sonntagsblatt for example asked whether the re-emergence of Prussianism in 
the GDR was a mere coincidence at a time when the state was increasingly embarrassed 
by its citizens’ calls for more freedom. It also posed the question whether references to 
the Prussian virtues of obedience and subordination were attempts to silence these 
demands.44 Another Christian newspaper was convinced that the East’s reappraisal of 
Prussian virtues was nothing less than an attempt to justify austerity in a period of 
economic crisis.45 The attacks of these Christian newspapers were certainly influenced by 
the growing tensions between oppositional church groups and the GDR since the mid-
1970s.46 Yet, these comments were largely representative of the critical views of the 
developments in the GDR in the West. 
These comments reveal the changing East and West German roles within the 
emerging public discourse about Prussia. When the Prussia exhibition eventually opened 
in West Berlin in 1981 — not in the Reichstag but in the Martin-Gropius-Bau — the 
central executive committee of the SED (Zentralkommitee) was clearly interested. 
Repeatedly, otherwise rare permissions for visits in West Berlin were issued to high-
ranking members of the Institute of History of the Academy of Social Sciences (Akademie 
für Gesellschaftswissenschaften) and employees of the Zentralkommitee, allowing them 
to visit the exhibition.47 The close monitoring of the Western developments continued 
until 1987, when both parts of the nation celebrated Berlin’s 750th anniversary. As Prussia 
became an established part of the historical narratives of both states, the two German 
states entered into a competition for the claim to be the legitimate representative of 
Prussian heritage. 48 The simultaneity of developments did, however, not necessarily 
imply a rapprochement between academics in both states. Despite the fact that – for the 
first time in almost 30 years – three delegates from the GDR participated in the 
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Historikertag in Mannheim in 1980, there were no signs of an official dialogue about the 
shared Prussian past between the East and West German historians. In the GDR, the West 
German publications about Prussia were either ignored by the official side, or interpreted 
as mere perpetuations of the reactionary Prussia myth. In West Germany, the works of at 
least two historians from the GDR, Ingrid Mittenzwei and Ernst Engelberg, attracted 
some interest. Engelberg, who conducted extensive research on Bismarck in West 
Germany, maintained a number of contacts with West German historians such as Werner 
Conze.49 When in March 1987, historians from East and West convened at a conference 
organized by the historical commission of the SPD in Bonn, however, Prussian history 
did not feature prominently in the discussions.50  
Although the entangled debates about Prussian history must be regarded as 
triggers for the re-emergence of Prussia in the GDR, the Preußenrenaissance soon 
became a process with its own internal dynamics. As early as November 1978, GDR TV 
broadcasted a five-part miniseries dedicated to the Prussian military reformer 
Scharnhorst.51 Originally conceived as a broader period drama about the anti-Napoleonic 
Wars of Liberation, entitled The Main Offensive (Der Generalangriff), Scharnhorst was 
the first in an extensive line of film productions and documentaries about all possible 
aspects of Prussian history on East German state television. The shift of the production’s 
focus – from the people’s war against Napoleon to the famous Prussian general – had 
considerable symbolic significance. The main SED newspaper Neues Deutschland 
promoted the series as a contribution to the public understanding of one of the ‘most 
significant eras of our history’.52 And the West German news magazine Der Spiegel noted 
that GDR officials had apparently recovered a piece of formerly ‘scorched earth of 
German history’ in an obvious abandonment of its prior condemnation of Prussia as a 
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‘hotbed of militarism and fascism’.53 The next significant step towards Prussia’s public 
rehabilitation in the GDR came in early 1979 with a major article in the SED’s main 
Marxist theory journal Einheit, written by the leading historians Walter Schmidt, Horst 
Bartel and, again, Ingrid Mittenzwei.54 The article provided a more elaborate explanation 
of the new turn towards Prussian history but broadly followed the line developed in 
Mittenzwei’s earlier Forum article. Thus, the significance of the Einheit article resided 
less in its actual contents than in the fact that it was published in one of the main party 
organs. This had particular implications within a system that required officials and other 
figures close to the state to read between the lines of official statements to trace the 
designs of the party leadership. The publication of such an article could only be 
interpreted as the assent of the Politburo to the new ideological line.  
Almost simultaneously, Mittenzwei published the first edition of her  – in many 
ways ground-breaking – biography of Frederick the Great.55 In a perspective that was 
unusual for Marxist-Leninist historians, she offered an individualistic and psychological 
portrayal of Frederick’s life, focusing on the weaknesses, shortcomings but also the 
ambitions and achievements of the Prussian king. Overall, Mittenzwei emphasized 
Frederick’s positive impact on the course of German history. In her view, the king was 
not an exponent of the reactionary Prussianism, as most classical Marxists had asserted, 
but an enlightened ruler who contributed to Germany’s progressive heritage.56 Without 
explicitly stating it, Mittenzwei abandoned nearly all hitherto established verdicts about 
the Prussian past. Nevertheless, her work was not entirely unprecedented within East 
German academic historiography. Prussia and the anti-Napoleonic Wars of Liberation 
had already been a matter of intellectual debate during the 1950s.57 The downright 
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negative image of Prussia within GDR academia had been partially revised during the 
1960s. Now, however, these rather isolated debates became part of the official 
legitimizing narrative of the East German state. In July 1980, comments by state leader 
Erich Honecker highlighted this development. In an interview with the British newspaper 
proprietor Robert Maxwell, he declared that Mittenzwei’s biography of Frederick the 
Great was not to be viewed as an innovative break-through but rather as a natural 
expression of the long-established relation of the GDR to its historic heritage.58 With this 
statement, Honecker clearly sought to downplay the fundamental character of the changes 
in the official politics of history. Yet, the pace with which the academically revised image 
of Prussian history was translated into symbolic policies is remarkable. 
The GDR’s Preußenrenaissance reached its first peak in 1980 when the 
equestrian statue of Frederick the Great was returned to its original place on the boulevard 
Unter den Linden. As a symbolic act, this measure was on a par with the demolition of 
the architectural remainders of Prussianism in the 1950s and 1960s. The resurrection of 
‘Old Fritz’ in direct sight of the Palace of the Republic and the State Council building 
was a clear hint of the direction in which the ruling nomenclature was now facing. It is 
therefore not surprising that the considerable costs of one million GDR Marks for the re-
erection of the equestrian statue were covered without major discussions.59 
Between 1980 and 1987, the new conception of history was extended to other 
periods and formerly neglected personalities. With the looming ‘Martin Luther Year’ 
marking the reformer’s 500th birthday in 1983, preparations for the celebrations became 
another priority for the SED.60 This anniversary provided the occasion to integrate Luther 
into the canon of relevant historical reference points. Traditionally, Marxist historians had 
favoured the radical movements of the Reformation era over the socially conservative 
Luther. Figures such as the reformer Thomas Müntzer and the uprisings of the German 
Peasants’ War in the sixteenth century had their fixed place in the traditional socialist 
narratives of German history.61 These, however, were increasingly pushed into the 
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background, making way for an uncritical celebration of Luther. Another unlikely 
historical personality who received increased public attention was Otto von Bismarck. In 
1985 the doyen of East German academic historiography, Ernst Engelberg, published his 
Bismarck biography with the suggestive sub-title Arch-Prussian and Founder of the 
Empire (Urpreuße und Reichsgründer). In his book, Engelberg presented a rather positive 
image of his subject.62 He emphasized Bismarck’s roots in Prussian traditions and virtues 
as a prerequisite for his main historical achievement – the creation of the German Empire. 
Despite being a lifelong communist, Engelberg performed an ideological volte-face with 
regards to Bismarck. Traditional socialist and communist historians had presented the 
‘Iron Chancellor’ as the archetypical exponent of Prussian Junkerism and reactionary 
politics.63 Now, it seemed that the GDR even tried to integrate the initiator of the infamous 
Socialist Laws into its heritage.64  
It would, however, oversimplify the problem if we interpreted these developments 
as a straightforward process steered entirely from above. Ernst Engelberg, for example, 
insisted that ‘no one, not even the central executive committee of the SED’ had influenced 
his academic engagement with Bismarck.65 During a public lecture at the Academy of 
Sciences in East Berlin in 1984, he went even further by expressing his delight about 
Mittenzwei’s reference to his own ‘Prussian initiative’. He dismissed the idea that there 
was a ‘political command central’ in East Berlin, which would have initiated the turn 
towards Prussia in the GDR. For him ’ordinary historians were the first to acknowledge 
that we could not avoid the engagement with researching and writing Prussian history.’66 
This was clearly an understatement as Engelberg and most of the other academic actors 
of the Preußenrenaissance were not merely ‘ordinary historians’ but high-ranking 
academics either at the Institute of History at the Academy of Sciences or employed at 
the highly esteemed Humboldt University in Berlin. Moreover, many historians involved 
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in the reappraisal of Prussian history, including Mittenzwei, were former disciples or 
colleagues of Engelberg. It is therefore not surprising that East Berlin became, at least in 
the academic context, the hub for the Prussia revival in the GDR.  
Outside Berlin, historians did not universally embrace the new image of Prussia. 
One contrasting case was a monograph about the Prussian king Frederick William I by 
the Halle-based historian Heinz Kathe.67 Its first edition, published in 1976 largely 
adopted the traditionally negative Marxist judgement about Frederick William I and the 
Prussian state in general. Frederick I was presented as the founding father of Prussian 
militarism and despotism. In his conclusion, Kathe stated that the ‘uncompromising 
ideological fight’ of the communists against Prussianism could rely on the established 
judgements of the Marxist classics about the fateful role of the Junkers and the 
bourgeoisie as arch-enemies of the people in German history.68 This view remained 
unchanged in all subsequent editions of the book throughout the 1980s, reflecting none 
of the ideological oscillations about Prussia that occurred in this period. Kathe’s 
persistence was certainly representative of traditionalist Marxists who did not support the 
rehabilitation of Prussia. Open criticism of the party, however, was out of question for 
this group. Thus, their maintenance of the traditional views was a tacit form of criticism. 
Others were more open in their questioning of the official politics of history. In 
his 1981 play The Prussians Are Coming (Die Preußen kommen), the author Claus 
Hammel openly ridiculed the manufacturing of a new historical identity for the GDR.69 
Taking the return of the statue of Frederick II to Unter den Linden in 1980 as his starting 
point, Hammel questioned the official roles of the historical figures who had now been 
allowed to return from their former exile in the ‘historical hinterland’. In the play, the two 
main figures in this process, Martin Luther and Frederick II, are put before a tribunal 
composed of historians, officials and workers who are to decide whether the two can be 
integrated into the stock of the GDR’s official historical traditions. A female history 
professor on the committee repeatedly tries to curb the enthusiasm of the other panel 
members by putting Frederick and Luther into an academic perspective. However, 
officials and workers barely listen to her and turn into out-and-out fans of the two 
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historical personalities. Although not necessarily an attack on the renewed interest in 
Prussian history in the GDR itself, the play was clearly a satire of the attempts to utilise 
it for the SED’s purposes. An unequivocal publicity stunt at the Hans Otto Theatre in 
Potsdam illustrates this: during the first 15 performances of the play, two actors, wearing 
the uniform of the Potsdam Giant Guards Regiment (Lange Kerls or ‘Long Lads’), sang 
a parody of the unofficial Prussian anthem Üb’ immer Treu und Redlichkeit with a slightly 
altered verse: ‘Always be faithful and true/ until your dying day/ Do not stray a 
fingerbreadth/ from Erich’s given way’.70 The Prussians are Coming was staged between 
1981 and 1983 in Berlin’s Maxim Gorki Theatre, the Hans Otto Theatre in Potsdam, and 
the City Theatre in Rostock. The play’s popularity became evident in 1983 when the GDR 
state television broadcasted it as part of its primetime programme.71  
The openness with which Hammel criticized the SED’s new take on Prussian 
history is remarkable. Strikingly, there were apparently no serious attempts to curb him. 
On the contrary, the fact that GDR TV broadcasted the play suggests a certain level of 
sympathy among the responsible officials. As media and cultural life were more or less 
tightly controlled by the party, the broadcast highlights the ambiguous and at times 
contradictory character of the Preußenrenaissance in the GDR. A possible explanation 
for this inconsistency can be found in the fact that the new conception of Prussian history 
was not fully embraced by everyone in the SED’s rank and file. This could have been the 
case either because they adhered to the older views on Prussia, or simply because the new 
historical narrative was far from clear or coherent. Yet, the almost simultaneous 
promotion and open criticism of the new course certainly reveals some of the problems 
of enforcing the new conception of Prussian history. The complex structures of media 
control in the GDR might have been a contributing factor. In order to avoid accusations 
of open censorship, the SED often delegated the responsibility to conform with the 
official line to journalists, artists and producers themselves, thus creating a system of self-
censorship. The party indirectly steered this process by setting out a framework of 
ideological guidelines and informal mechanisms of control.72 Yet, this also gave 
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individual actors a certain leeway for their own interpretations of the official line. The 
room for these individual interpretations was greater the more diffuse the official 
guidelines were. This seems to have been the case with the new view of Prussian history. 
These circumstances help explain why both the promotion and criticism of the new 
historical identity were mainly the product of individual initiatives rather than a centrally 
steered project. 
The cases that have been described thus far mostly involved intellectuals and 
officials. In order to reconstruct popular reactions and to assess the success and failure of 
the Preußenrenaissance as a legitimizing strategy, it is necessary to broaden the scope of 
the enquiry. For this purpose, an analysis of the representations of Prussia in television 
and film and the reactions of the viewers offers important insights. 
 
IV. Televising the new image: media representations of Prussia and their reception 
Before 1978, Prussia as a subject was barely covered by the East German television. Until 
this point, merely six productions dedicated to Prussia had been aired on GDR TV. 
Furthermore, when chosen as a subject, many productions adhered to the established 
negative framework of Prussian history. The 1970 production The Spirit of Potsdam (Der 
Geist von Potsdam) exemplified these traditionalist representations of Prussian history.73 
The script combined narrative and historiographical elements to promote the notion of 
the GDR as being the socialist conqueror of Prussianism. For this purpose, it told the 
parallel stories of a poor peasant family named Pagel and their feudal landlords, the von 
Arnims. Whereas the von Arnims dominated in the era of servitude and rural poverty in 
Prussian times, the fortunes of the two families changed with the socialist takeover after 
1945. Now, the peasant family ruled over the land of their former masters in the workers’ 
and peasants’ state of the GDR. The Prussia epitomized by the Spirit of Potsdam was 
again a cipher for Junkerism and militarism.74  
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Other productions presented some positive aspects even before the 
Preußenrenaissance. Of the six pre-1978 productions, three dealt with military traditions 
and the National People’s Army (Nationale Volksarmee, NVA). The NVA and its 
predecessors maintained Prussian military traditions to a high degree and this was 
reflected in these productions.75 Broadcasts such as Soldier and Tradition (Soldat und 
Tradition) of 1962 or A City and its Soldiers (Eine Stadt und ihre Soldaten) of 1965 
embodied this ambiguous approach to Prussian military traditions.76 Even the highest 
military decorations of the GDR were named after the Prussian generals of the Wars of 
Liberation, Scharnhorst and Blücher. A distinction was made, however, between the 
maintenance of Prussian military traditions and the ideological commitment to socialism. 
In the military context, references to Prussian traditions helped to reinforce notions of an 
allegedly historic brotherhood-in-arms with the Russians. They were also used to 
distinguish the NVA from the West German Bundeswehr, emphasizing the former’s 
rootedness in national history.  
Although Prussian history was selectively adapted to substantiate ideological 
statements, the subject did not attract significant attention before the end of the 1970s. 
From 1978 onwards, however, GDR TV accompanied the official revision of the image 
of Prussia with a multitude of productions. In November 1978, the aforementioned five-
part series Scharnhorst marked the starting point. This was followed by a drama about 
the military reformer and philosopher of war, Clausewitz in 1980 and reached its peak 
with the expensive and extravagant film production Saxony’s Splendour and Prussia’s 
Glory (Sachsens Glanz und Preußens Gloria), broadcast between 1985 and 1987. Prussia 
now emerged as the subject of dramatic adaptations, whereas documentaries were pushed 
to the background. This format put historical personalities in the spotlight and, to a certain 
extent, allowed the viewers to identify with the protagonists. These productions 
approached the past from the perspective of those great men in high ranks that Marxist 
historians had explicitly rejected. With kings, ministers, and generals taking centre stage, 
the representation of ‘ordinary’ people became an issue of secondary importance. This, 
however, does not necessarily indicate a general reversal of the ideological convictions 
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of officials responsible for TV productions. The initiatives and ideas for historical topics 
often came from other sources. For instance, the creator of the Scharnhorst series, Wolf-
Dieter Panse, admitted that his rather positive views on Prussian history had been formed 
during his youth and that he had never identified with the negative image of Prussia in 
the early GDR.77 This statement is significant with regards to the aforementioned 
generational aspects of the Preußenrenaissance. Panse had been born in 1930 and thus 
formed part of the aforementioned ‘1929er’ generation, for whom the positive portrayal 
of Prussia exercised a particular appeal. According to Panse, there was no direct meddling 
in the production process.78 Nonetheless, the content and implicit message of the 
production featured a high degree of consistency with the new line on Prussia, as 
proclaimed in journals and books at the time. The available sources contain no evidence 
that this course was steered or coordinated by a central agency within party or state.  
It seems that the positive popular reception of the rather traditional productions 
Scharnhorst and Clausewitz encouraged GDR TV to pursue more ambitious projects. The 
most significant example was the production of Sachsens Glanz und Preußens Gloria . 
This film series was a cinematic adaption of Jozef Ignacy Kraszewski’s novel From Saxon 
Times (Aus der Sachsenzeit). It was commissioned in late 1980; the actual filming started 
in 1982.79 A key element of the film series was the era of the Elector of Saxony and King 
of Poland, August I (‘the Strong’), and the reign of Prussia’s Frederick II. According to 
an interview from 1995, screenwriter Albrecht Börner and director Hans-Joachim 
Kasprzik found their inspiration for the film series in the football grounds of the GDR 
and the frequent displays of regional, particularly Saxon, identities.80 Like Wolf-Dieter 
Panse, Börner (born in 1929) and Kasprzik (born in 1928) were members of the ‘1929er’ 
generation. Their take on the Saxon and Prussian past was apparently less influenced by 
the older, negative Marxist tradition and much more flexible in its appreciation for the 
great historical figures. It was therefore not surprising that the idea for the project already 
developed before the official revision of the official conception of Prussian history. Yet, 
the emerging discourse about Tradition und Erbe may have encouraged Börner and 
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Kasprzik to pursue their project. Börner had started working on the script for a film 
adaptation of the novel in the mid-1970s but could not convince officials to provide funds 
for the production.81 Matters had changed by 1980. The same script now received 
approval from the GDR TV management without major complications. A panel of 
renowned historians advised Börner during the further development of the script and 
afterwards assessed its revised version. In this instance, professional historians served as 
intermediaries between the new conception of history and its popular depiction. One of 
the historical consultants was, for example, Günter Vogler of the Humboldt University, a 
renowned expert of Prussian history and lead author of an authoritative textbook on the 
topic.82  
Nonetheless, the project also faced opposition from within the SED. When the 
script was first presented at a conference of cultural officials in Dresden, the script was 
almost completely rejected for its ‘petty bourgeois presentation of history’. The 
discussion involved accusations of a falsification of history and criticism about the 
absence of ‘ordinary’ people. Questions were raised as to whether the project was 
compatible with the Marxist-Leninist conception of history.83 Börner’s explanation that 
this was conceived as a contribution to the understanding of local history and the deeper 
understanding of tradition and heritage did not convince the officials at this meeting. At 
any other time, such a verdict would have meant the end for such an ambitious project. 
In 1980, however, the interest in the project led to a second chance for Börner. In order 
to invalidate the objections, an expert opinion by the Leipzig-based historian Karl Czok 
was commissioned by the head dramaturge of the production Erika Emuth. Czok’s 
assessment of the script was extraordinarily positive.84 Additionally, producers and the 
responsible editors at GDR TV submitted upbeat projections of viewer numbers and 
anticipated public perceptions of the series.85 This intervention finally led to the 
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production, between 1982 and 1985, of those four parts of the original six-part series 
between that dealt with Prussian history. The originally planned first two parts that 
focused on Saxony and August the Strong were postponed to a later date when additional 
funding would be available. This suggests that the SED’s primary interest focused on the 
popular depiction of Prussia and Frederick II.86   
New problems arose shortly after the actual shooting. Director Kasprzik and 
screenwriter Börner sought to avoid allegations of whitewashing Prussian history by 
incorporating some more controversial scenes into the film. This included the graphic 
depiction of a Prussian soldier running the gauntlet and a scene in which Frederick orders 
the pillaging of the castle of his Saxon adversary Count Brühl. These two scenes caused 
concern during a test screening for SED officials in 1984. They argued that such a 
portrayal of the Prussian king was inappropriate in light of the new circumstances.87 One 
official stated that it was crucial to point out ‘how good the king was and not how bad’.88 
After this intervention, the scenes were cut out from the final version of the film. The 
broadcast of the first four parts during the Christmas holidays of 1985 proved massively 
successful with critics and TV audiences in the GDR. Over 30% of all East German 
households watched each part of the series on GDR TV.89  The costume drama genre and 
the multiple threads of the story appealed to a mass audience beyond the GDR: the West 
German ARD channel had bought the West German rights for the series in 1985 and 
broadcast it in 1987 as its official contribution to the celebrations of Berlin’s 750th 
anniversary. It achieved similar success rates with approximately 20% of all households 
watching.90  
The positive reception of the Prussia-centred parts of the series led to the 
production of the earlier parts, focusing on Saxon history under August the Strong and 
his mistress, the Countess Cosel. These two parts, however, could only be produced with 
help of the licence fees paid by the West German state public television ARD. Though 
attempts were made to cut costs wherever possible, the production of the last two parts 
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amounted to 9.7 million DDR Marks, costing nearly as much as the first four films (11.8 
million DDR Marks) combined.91   
Besides the TV-specific considerations that led to the production of these parts, 
the production also sought to counter-balance the emphasis on Prussian history. The two 
parts that dealt with Saxon history were broadcasted on Christmas 1987, achieving 
equally high viewer number as their Prussian counterparts. Sachens Glanz und Preußens 
Gloria marked the peak of public representations of Prussia in the state media. What 
followed were less costly documentaries about Prussian history with titles such as 
Prussia’s Best Men (Die besten Männer Preußens)92 and a feature about Frederick II titled 
The Horseman Unter den Linden (Der Reiter Unter den Linden) in 1986.93 The almost 
panegyric celebration of Frederick in the latter exemplified his mystification as a patron 
of the late GDR.  
Scholarship of the Preußenrenaissance has hitherto neglected the impact on the 
general GDR public of the propagated new conceptions of history. The question of how 
the ’Prussian turn’ in German history was perceived and whether it actually enhanced the 
state’s legitimacy is indeed rather difficult to answer. By and large, it can be argued that 
the new approach was received favourably by the GDR public. High visitor numbers at 
dedicated exhibitions such as the one held in 1986 in Potsdam’s Neues Palais castle 
testify to the increased public interest in Prussian history. The 1980s also saw the 
emergence of a number of military re-enactment groups dedicated to Prussia and to the 
era of the Wars of Liberation. The 170th anniversary of the Battle of Nations in Leipzig 
in 1983 triggered a surge in the number of such groups in the GDR.  
The viewers’ letters that reached GDR TV provide a more nuanced image. The 
reactions expressed in the surviving letters range from emphatically positive appraisals to 
criticism and confusion. In a viewers’ letter from May 1980, for example, an elderly 
women from Jena expressed her firm belief that figures such as ‘Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, 
York, Blücher, […] Moltke, Roon, Hötzendorf, Hindenburg, Mackensen’ would provide 
great role models for the youth of the GDR. Yet, she also lamented that the historical 
films of GDR TV ‘are met with little interest from today’s young people.’94 This 
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observation seems to underline argument that the impact of the new historical narrative 
was mainly limited to certain generations and lacked attraction for younger audiences. 
Another viewers’ letter from 1988 suggests an increasingly critical perception of the 
Preußenrenaissance in the GDR. On the one hand, the letter emphasised that Prussian 
history was an ambiguous but nevertheless interesting matter for most GDR citizens. Yet, 
it ended with the critical remark that ‘its depiction, however, needs to be objective and 
truthful’.95 A comment that could be understood as a veiled criticism of the TV 
productions.Other viewers expressed their irritation about the new course and the positive 
depiction of Prussia more openly. An anonymous letter from 1986 that reacted to the 
broadcast of The Horseman Unter den Linden exemplifies such sentiments: 
I want to speak out about the exhibition about the Prussian king Frederick II. I am 
almost 70 years old, miner by profession. I want to point out that in the years 1950–
1960 people spoke differently about this king, and that radio and television reported 
completely different. They called him sabre-rattler, a man who exploited ordinary 
people and soldiers. And how do people speak now — 30 years later — of him? I 
want to conceal my name but these are facts and many elderly people think in the 
same way. 96 
 
This exemplary statement suggests that some viewers were aware of the profound turns 
in the GDR’s politics of history. These changes were seemingly not as comprehensible 
and consistent as those responsible might have hoped for. Moreover, it is unclear whether 
Prussia was indeed accepted as a specific historical tradition of the GDR, or whether it 
rather appealed to a sense of German unity and thus ran counter to the party’s intentions. 
While the self-contradictory character reduced the appeal of the new identity policy, it 
did not necessarily diminish the popularity of the films. By and large, the viewers’ letters 
suggest that many people were able to enjoy the opulent productions without buying into 
the more or less subliminal ideological messages.  
 
V. Conclusion 
The re-emergence of Prussian history in the GDR of the 1980s has to be interpreted in the 
light the SED’s changing policies on identity and legitimacy. Following Sigrid 
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Meuschel’s subdivision of these policies into three main stages, the emphasis on Prussian 
heritage has to be seen as an expression of a growing nationalistic element in official 
propaganda during the final crisis (Finalitätskrise) of the GDR.97 By this point, the 
formerly dominant socialist and antifascist narratives of legitimacy that characterized the 
early phases of the GDR had apparently lost their appeal. Within these narratives the 
traditional socialist conception of Prussian history had regularly been utilized as a 
complementary, and often negative, narrative of the German past in order to underline 
notions of progress and rupture. From the end of the 1970s, however, positive 
interpretations of Prussian history played an increasingly prominent role in the official 
representations of collective identity in the GDR. Now, Tradition und Erbe became the 
dominant categories of the history discourse and the Prussian past came to be incorporated 
into representations of the ‘socialist German nation’. The 1980s eventually saw the 
integration of formerly rejected historical figures and eras into the canon of historical 
references for the East German state. Established Marxist-Leninist judgments of the past 
were in many cases creatively circumvented to integrate formerly controversial figures 
such as Martin Luther, Frederick II and Bismarck into the official historical heritage. Yet, 
in order to understand the reasons for this ideological volte-face and some of its inner 
dynamics, a number of factors have to be taken into account. 
Firstly, the entanglements with the politics of history in the Federal Republic 
played a crucial role in triggering publications and broadcasts on Prussian history in East 
Germany. After plans for a major exhibition in the Reichstag in West Berlin became 
public in 1977, the SED leadership was overanxious to strengthen its claims to being the 
legitimate custodian of German national history as a whole and therefore of genuine 
Germanness. The revival of Prussian history in West Germany appeared in a time when 
discourses about the ‘lost identity’ of the FRG facilitated a re-emergence of nationalistic 
motives in the public history discourse. Yet, whilst the rediscovered appreciation for 
medieval South-West German or Bavarian history in the West had mainly regional 
implications, the history of Prussia possessed – because of its geographical shape – an 
inherent German-German dimension. In addition to the inward-looking aspects of the 
Preußenrenaissance in both German states, the representations of Prussian history 
became a historical-political battleground for the claim to represent the German nation as 
a whole. Nonetheless, whereas the extraordinary public excitement about Prussian history 
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in West Germany – with the exception of West Berlin – slowly petered out after the 
exhibition in 1981, it continued in the GDR until at least 1987. To a degree, the revision 
of Prussian history in the GDR was driven by the events in the West. Yet, it soon 
developed an inner dynamics that cannot be solely explained by the entangled German 
dimension of the Preußenrenaissance. 
A second explanation for Prussia’s emergence as a central part of the politics of 
history in the GDR lies in generational shifts. Those involved in the creation and 
propaganda of the new conception of Prussian history in academia and state media – with 
the notable exception of Ernst Engelberg (born in 1909) – almost entirely belonged to the 
‘1929er’ generation. The author of the ground-breaking biography of Frederick II, Ingrid 
Mittenzwei, was born in 1929. The producers of the most important period dramas about 
Prussian history, Wolf-Dieter Panse, Hans-Joachim Kasprzik and Albrecht Börner were 
all born between 1928 and 1930. As Panse’s statements indicated, their views of Prussian 
history may have been shaped less by the traditionally negative Marxist-Leninist 
interpretations but more by Prussia’s positive depiction in the Third Reich.98 Moreover, 
Prussia – in the way they popularized it – embodied a symbolism in which stability and 
strong leadership were presented as means of historical progress. The reference to this 
positive version of Prussian history seems to have provided them with a coherent 
historical narrative of collective identity in the face of the GDR’s crisis.  
Although the individual reasons for the engagement with Prussian history were 
certainly complex, the emergence of the new ideological framework of Tradition und 
Erbe from the mid-1970s allowed historians and cultural workers to openly articulate 
their own positive views on Prussian history. Against this backdrop, the claim of 
historians and cultural workers that they did not receive instructions to launch this process 
seems credible. The ideas and projects that shaped the Preußenrenaissance in the GDR 
were often rooted in individual initiatives. The statements of Engelberg, Panse, Börner 
and Kasprzik confirm this interpretation. A certain notion of self-assertion (Eigensinn) of 
many actors came to the fore in this context. Yet, these individual initiatives could only 
be realized because the SED leadership apparently recognized their potential for its own 
politics of history and therefore supported them. This party patronage then encouraged 
                                                          
98
 For a discussion of the representations of Prussia in the Third Reich see K.-H. Schoeps, 
Literature and Film in the Third Reich (Elisabethtown, NY, 2004), pp. 138-142; L. Schulte-
Sasse, Entertaining the Third Reich: Illusions of Wholeness in Nazi Cinema  (Durham, NC, 
1996), pp. 92-125. 
28 
 
others to pursue similar projects, which resulted in academic conferences, public 
exhibitions, TV productions and further publications on Prussian history in the 1980s. 
Whilst these dynamics might reflect a certain wide-spread opportunism within academia 
and culture, others reacted more critically, as the examples of Claus Hammel’s play The 
Prussians are Coming and the work of the historian Heinz Kathe indicate. Nonetheless, 
the fact that the promotion and more or less open criticism of the new conception of 
Prussian history occurred almost simultaneously suggests that the politics of history in 
the late GDR cannot be understood in terms of authoritarian rule alone. Instead of directly 
ordering and controlling the SED sought to set out a framework of ideological guidelines 
that was then filled by the various actors according to their own interpretations of the new 
course. This framework was in many ways incoherent and equivocal as the older views 
of Marxist historians on Prussia were never officially renounced by the SED. This also 
explains the frictions and at times contradictory actions among rank-and-file party 
members as the reactions to Sachsens Glanz und Preußens Gloria  demonstrate.  
Finally, the public reception of the new course was an ambiguous matter, too. 
Although most of the historical publications and broadcasts met with an altogether 
positive response, they widely failed to create new patterns of identity and legitimacy for 
the SED. The inconsistency of the public representations of Prussian history certainly 
contributed to this fact. Yet, another explanation for the failure of the Preußenrenaissance 
as a legitimizing historical narrative might be found its aforementioned generational 
dimension. It was in many respects a narrative of the ‘1929er’ generation and it seems to 
have mainly appealed to members of this generation. Those born earlier seem to have 
persisted in the negative views of Prussian history, or were at least more aware of the 
ideological contradictions between earlier Marxist interpretations and the new image. On 
the other hand, the relevance of Prussian history for those born after 1945, the so-called 
‘1949er’ generation, was probably very small.99 For them Prussia was a matter of the past 
without a direct connection to their own lives. They might have enjoyed the opulent TV 
dramas and publications on the topic, yet without necessarily identifying with the implicit 
political message. Nevertheless, in order to reconstruct the effects of the 
Preußenrenaissance on the political consciousness of GDR citizens and its longer-lasting 
impact on their collective identities, more case studies are needed. Moreover, a 
                                                          
99
 For the ‘1949er’ generation, see D. Wierling, Geboren im Jahr Eins: Der Jahrgang 1949 
in der DDR. Versuch einer Kollektivbiographie (Berlin, 2002); Idem, ‘How do the 1929ers 
and the 1949ers differ?’, in M. Fulbrook (ed.), Power and Society in the GDR, pp. 204-219. 
29 
 
transnational comparison of the turn towards national history as a legitimizing narrative 
in the 1970s and 1980s within other state-socialist countries and with similar 
developments in other Western countries could help to put this phenomenon into a 
broader perspective.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The ‘Renaissance of Prussianism’ (Preußenrenaissance), which began in the late-1970s 
and continued throughout the 1980s in the German Democratic Republic, has received 
considerable scholarly attention. In this context, mainly the involvement of academic 
historians in the revision of the official conception of history of the socialist East German 
state has been discussed. This article offers, however, new perspectives on hitherto 
neglected aspects of the Preußenrenaissance. It explores the German-German 
entanglements of this phenomenon by linking it with almost simultaneous events in West 
Germany. By the mid-1980s both German states had embraced Prussia as a part of their 
redefined collective identities and had entered into a competition for representing its 
historical heritage. Yet, this piece also looks at the ways by which the new conception of 
German national history was transmitted and popularised in the GDR media. From 1978, 
the state television promoted a positive view of Prussian history with opulent productions 
such as Sachsens Glanz and Preußens Gloria . An analysis of viewers’ letters offers some 
insight into the popular perception of the new course. Against this backdrop, this article 
also highlights that the ideological volte-face regarding Prussia’s history was not 
unanimously supported within the rank-and-file of the ruling Socialist Unity Party. In 
fact, the Preußenrenaissance in the late GDR proved to be a chequered and often 
contradictory process which was shaped by the many self-willed actors. The article 
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concludes with a brief consideration of the interplay between these various actors 
involved in the Preußenrenaissance and their specific motivations.  
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